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TESTAMENTARY DESIGNATIONS 
OF ATTORNEYS AND OTHER 
EMPLOYEES 
JEAN FLEMING POWERS* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The power to control the distribution of one's estate is gen-
erally expected and even taken for granted by most American 
testators,l Although some limitations are expected,2 such as limi-
• Associate Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law, Houston, Texas; J.D., 
University of Houston Law Center, 1978; B.A., University of Texas at Austin, 1970. The 
author gratefully acknowledges the helpful comments of Associate Dean Sandra DeGraw, 
South Texas College of Law. 
1. "Where not expressly limited by local statute, the power of a testator to dispose 
of his realty, as well as his personalty, by last will and testament, has always been recog-
nized in the United States." 1 W. BOWE, D. PARKER, W. PAGE, PAGE ON WILLS § 2.18, at 
59 (3d edt 1960) (hereinafter PAGE ON WILLS). 
2. Generally the "right" to dispose of property by will is not considered to be consti-
tutionally protected. The states are therefore free to set certain . limitations. As the 
United States Supreme Court held in Irving Trust CO. V. Day: 
Rights of succession to the property of a deceased, whether by 
will or by intestacy, are of statutory creation, and the dead 
hand rules succession only by sufferance. Nothing in the Fed-
eral Constitution forbids the legislature of a state to limit, 
condition, or even abolish the owner of testamentary disposi-
tion over property within its jurisdiction. 
Irving Trust Co., 314 U.S. 555, 555-56 (1942). But see Nunnemacher V. State, 129 Wis. 
190, 108 N.W. 627 (1906), in which the Supreme Court of Wisconsin stated: 
That there are inherent rights existing in the people prior to 
the making of any of our Constitutions is a fact recognized 
and declared by the Declaration of Independence, and by sub-
stantially every state Constitution. Our own Constitution says 
in its very first article: "All men are born equally free and in-
dependent and have certain inherent rights; among these are 
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness .... " Unquestion-
ably this expression ["pursuit of happiness"] covers the idea 
of the acquisition of private property; not that the possession 
of property is the supreme good, but that there is planted in 
the breast of every person the desire to possess something use-
ful or something pleasing which will serve to render life enjoy-
261 
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tations on the amount of wealth that may be transferred,s limi-
tations on the length of time the testator may control his prop-
erty after death,' and restrictions on the use of property,& the 
testator's intent is still of paramount importance in determining 
the distribution of his estate.8 In fact, some of the limitations on 
the ability to direct the distribution of property are designed to 
give effect to the testator's real intent, for example, by protect-
ing him from undue pressures which might thwart that intent.7 
The testator controls not only the disposition of assets, but 
also can determine who will handle the disposition by ap-
pointing an executor and, in some cases, trustees and/or guardi-
ans.8 Indeed many testators seek to extend their control a step 
further and determine the employees to be engaged for certain 
purposes by their fiduciaries or beneficiaries.s 
able, which shall be his very own, and which he may dispose 
of as he chooses, or leave to his children or his dependents at 
his decease. To deny that there is such universal desire, or to 
deny that the fulfillment of this desire contributes'in a large 
degree to the attainment of human happiness is to deny a fact 
as patent as the shining of the sun at noonday. 
Nunnemacher, 129 Wis. at 200-201, 108 N.W. at 629 (emphasis added). Accord, In re 
Estate of Devroy, 109 Wis.2d 154, 157,325 N.W.2d 345, 346 (1982). 
3. Estate taxes, in a very real sense, limit the amount of wealth which can be freely 
transferred by will. See 1 PAGE ON WILLS, supra note I, § 3.1, at 67. 
4. The rule against perpetuities limits the length of time a United States testator 
may continue to control the use of his property after his death. See generally T, BERGIN 
& p, HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE INTERESTS, Ch. 8, I, at 178 (2d 
ed. 1984). 
5. There are some circumstances 
, . , in which unnatural provisions will be denied effect. In or-
der to conserve and protect the deceased's property, the courts 
will refuse to enforce destructful provisions in the will, such as 
those that provide for the burning of money, or that testator's 
house should be boarded over and left vacant for a long pe-
riod, or that his farm should go uncultivated and unworked; 
and of course gifts given for illegal purposes will also be de-
clared void. 
1 PAGE ON WILLS, supra note I, § 3.11, at 94. 
6. 4 PAGE ON WILLS, supra note I, 30.6 (1961); see also Bankers Trust of South 
Carolina v. Truesdale, 237 S.E.2d 45, 48 (S.C. 1977). 
7. Where the testator is acting under undue influence, mistake, or fraud, the will 
may be found to be invalid, although it technically reflects the "intent" of the testator 
when executed. 1 PAGE ON WILLS, supra note I, § 5.7, at 175-76. 
8. See generally J, GRUBATZ, 1 BLOOM, & L, SOLOMON, ESTATES AND TRUSTS: CASES, 
PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 3.02 IB] (1], at 62 (1989); J. RITCHIE, N, ALFORD, JR., R. EFF-
LAND, DECENDANTS' ESTATES AND TRUSTS, Chapter 17, I, at 1168-69 (6th ed. 1982); T. 
ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS 108, at 602 (2d ed. 1953). 
9. 1 PAGE ON WILLS, supra note I, § 5.5, at 169. 
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Seeking this extra degree of control, however, potentially 
creates more problems and can actually defeat the intent of the 
testator. First of all, since personal services are involved in the 
employment relationship, personal discord and dissatisfaction, 
and even financial losses to the estate or beneficiary, may result 
if the direction is followed. Further, in trying to construe a will 
containing such designations of employment, courts must choose 
among a range of interpretations. The interpretation chosen 
could result in consequences not intended by the testator, such 
as the failure of the executor to qualify, the failure of a desig-
nated bequest,10 or a loss to the estate beneficiaries due to 
claims by the named employee. Finally, the problem of unin-
tended results is exacerbated by the fact that the decisions in 
this area have too often been made by looking more at the type 
of employment involved than at the intent of the testator, 
thereby giving little guidance for cases in which the facts do not 
match the facts of the precedents. 
This article sets forth a clear, principled analysis by which 
many of the problems in will construction can be alleviated. 
Such an analysis requires appropriate consideration of the testa-
tor's intent, his freedom to create conditions in the will, and the 
relationship between the two. Under this type of analysis, the 
result is not dictated by the nature of the employment. How-
ever, the type of employment has some influence on the result, 
since it has some bearing on the testator's intent. As is so often 
the case concerning written legal documents, the problems can 
be virtually eliminated by drafting with an awareness of the pit-
falls and clearly stating the testator's intent as to how tho'se pit-
falls are to be avoided. 
10. While the terms devise and bequest have specific legal meanings in relation to 
the character of the property involved, they are sometimes used interchangeably. T. AT-
KINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS I, at 4 (2d ed. 1953). Throughout this paper, 
the term "bequest" will refer to the testanlentary disposition of both real property and 
personal property. 
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II. PROBLEMS CREATED BY TESTAMENTARY DESIG-
NATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT 
A. DIFFICULTIES IN THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP - POLICY 
CONSIDERATIONS 
The cases dealing with testamentary designations of em-
ployment involve many different employment relationships, in-
cluding designations of attorneys, accountants, real estate 
agents, and business employees. The common thread in all of 
these cases is the personal services nature of the relationship. 
For example, in the Texas case of Kelley v. Marlin,11 the testa-
tor had directed that his long time real estate agent be hired to 
handle the sale of certain real property devised to his wife. The 
majority found the provision to be enforceable.12 The decision 
was based on the testator's expression of intent in "clear, unam-
biguous, and mandatory language" and on extrinsic evidence of 
the surrounding circumstances of the "professional and personal 
relationship" between the testator and the designated agent.13 
However, the difficulty in deciding this case is underscored by 
the fact that it was decided on rehearing, more than a year after 
the original opinion was delivered.14 In that opinion, the Court 
had found the direction to employ to be unenforceable based on 
the language used in the wilP~ and on a policy' against finding 
the intent to force the parties into a personal services 
relationship.16 
The real difficulty in this case, as pointed out in the final 
dissenting opinion, is the fact that the "exclusive real estate con-
tract would require Bill Marlin to perform personal services for 
Inez Drummet and would create a fiduciary relationship of trust 
11. 714 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. 1986). 
12. Id. at 305. 
13. Id. at 305; contra In re Estate of Fresia, 390 So.2d 176, 178 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1980) in which, unlike the Texas Court in Kelley, the court found a designation of a 
particular real estate agent to be advisory only, due to the fiduciary nature of the 
relationship. 
14. The original opinion was delivered May 8, 1985. 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 410 (May 8, 
1985), withdrawn 714 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. 1986). 
15. Id. at 411-12. 
16. Id. at 412. 
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and confidence" between the parties.17 As the Texas Court 
stated in its first Kelley opinion, each "person has unique quali-
ties, and each person has unique frailties. Tempers, personali-
ties, and abilities vary from person to person. Because people 
are unique, personal relationships are unique."18 Thus, these 
policy considerations involved in the creation of the personal re-
lationship have frequently led courts to look unfavorably at en-
forcement of such provisions. 19 
While the cases involve many types of personal services, the 
policy concerns are most frequently advanced in relation to tes-
tamentary appointments of an attorney to represent the estate.20 
One of the leading cases in this area is a case decided by the 
Supreme Court of California in 1894, In re Ogier's Estate.21 The 
court first pointed out that "[t]here is no such office or position 
. known to the law as 'attorney of an estate'," and that when an 
attorney serves in the probate or administration of an estate, he 
acts for the executor and not for the estate.22 The real objection 
which the court had, and which other courts have had in similar 
cases,23 is that the executor will be liable to the legatees under 
the will for mistakes made by the attorney.24 The court said that 
17. 714 S.W.2d at 308 (Wallace, J., dissenting). The dissent also sets forth the argu-
ment that a direction to the beneficiary to employ a named real estate agent to sell 
devised property should be unenforceable because it mandates performance of non-dele-
gable duty "contrary to the established law of both contracts and wills." Id. (Wallace, J., 
dissenting). However, this description is inapposite since such designations do not really 
involve the delegation of duties already in existence, but the creation of the duties in the 
first instance. 
Thus, rather than being a question of delegation, what is involved is more like a 
situation in which one party hires another to perform a personal service for a third party, 
such as one person hiring an attorney to defend a third party on a criminal charge, or 
hiring a doctor to care for a third person. See infra note 68 and accompanying text. A 
competent third party beneficiary in this situation could certainly decline the services 
offered, but not based on any delegation argument. Likewise, delegation is not really the 
question when a direction to employ is made, and the objections to such directions must 
have another basis. 
18. Kelley, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 412. 
19. 1 PAGE ON WILLS, supra note I, § 5.5, at 171. 
20. Id. at 170. 
21. 101 Cal. 381, 35 P: 900 (1894): 
22. Id. at 385, 35 P. at 901. See also e.g., In re Braasch's Estate, 274 Wis. 569, 572, 
80 N.W.2d 759, 761 (1957) in which the court stated that "[h]istorically, the attorney for 
the executor was by no means so essential . . . An attorney's claim for services is nor-
mally against the Executor or Administrator ... "; In re Mark's Estate, 83 So.2d 853 
(I<;la. 1955). 
23. 1 PAGE ON WILLS supra note I, § 5.5, at 170. 
24. In re Ogier's Estate, 101 Cal. at 385, 35 P. at 901. See also In re Caldwell, 188 
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. . . if the attorney employed should be derelict 
in his duty, and should receive and misappropri-
ate funds of the estate, the executor would be lia-
ble therefor to the legatees under the will. This 
being so, it would seem to be neither reasonable 
nor right to hold that the executor of a will must 
necessarily accept the services of an attorney se-
lected by the testator.20 
B. POTENTIAL FOR UNINTENDED RESULTS 
The possibilities for interpretation of a testamentary desig-
nation of employment cover such a wide range that a court, not 
having adequate evidence of intent, could select an interpreta-
tion that would produce results not intended by the testator. At 
one extreme, the court could view the designation of employ-
ment of an individual by the estate as an unconditional bequest 
of the compensation which would be "earned" in the employ-
ment, based on a finding that that is the testator's intent. Under 
such an interpretation, the bequest is carried out even if the des- . 
ignated service never occurs. Thus, in In re Trybom's Will26 the 
court found that the testator's bequest to his associate of his 
interest in his office furniture and library, and one-half of his 
interest in pending legal matters " 'in consideration of the ser-
vices to be rendered in the probate of this my last Will and Tes-
tament'" was really a "reward to his office associate. "27 The 
court held that the gift was to be carried out in spite of the fact 
that the executor refused the associate's written offer of her ser-
vices as attorney for the estate.28 
Yet if the court were wrong in its interpretation of the tes-
N.Y. 115, 80 N.E. 663 (1907), in which the court stated: 
The law of this state does not recognize any testamentary 
power to control executors in the choice of the attorneys or 
counsel who shall act for them in their representative capacity. 
They may incur a personal liability for the conduct of their 
lawyers, and hence are beyond the contact of their testator in 
making the selection. 
Id. at 121, 80 N.E. at 664. 
25. In re Ogier's Estate, 101 Cal. at 385, 35 P. at 901. 
26. 277 N.Y. 106, 13 N.E.2d 596 (1938). 
27. Id. at 108, 13 N.E.2d at 597. 
28.Id. 
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tator's intent, there would be a loss to the estate without the 
receipt of services in return. The will in Trybom's is in fact open 
to another interpretation. Certainly, if an outright gift were in-
tended, it could have been more clearly expressed.29 As the dis-
senting justice forcefully pointed out, if the testator's "purpose 
was to make an absolute gift to appellant, without proviso or 
condition, this will demonstrates that he possessed the skill to 
express it by the omission of all unnecessary words."so Further, 
where the gift is nonetheless couched in terms creating an em-
ployment relationship, the "inference must be drawn that this 
testator expected his estate to receive a quid pro quo, and that, 
in consideration of this gift, his estate would be otherwise free 
from expenses in the probation of his will."sl In fact, the em-
ployment designation itself is strong evidence of intent that 
there be no outright gift, and another interpretation may be 
more likely to comport with the testator's intent. 
At the opposite extreme, the court could find that the desig-
nation, rather than creating an absolute right in the designated 
employee, creates no enforceable rights or obligations at all. Cer-
tainly many of the potential problems that are created by em-
ploymentdesignations could be avoided by construing the desig-
nation to be precatory rather than binding. S2 
In an early Kentucky case,ss the language, "'I desire that 
my friend Robert M. Jewell be retained in the employ of the 
firm .. .''' was interpreted as importing "no more than an ex-
pression of the testator's desire."34 Likewise, the Supreme Court 
of Iowa in In Re Myers' Estatesr. found that the testator's ex-
29. Ct. Zeltserman v. Woods, 333 Mass. 34, 127 N.E.2d 667 (1955), in which the 
person named to receive'the residue of a trust, the beneficiary having predeceased the 
testator, was also named executor and trustee. When he declined to serve as such, the 
heirs at law argued that he should forfeit the property for failure to perform the implied 
condition of service. The court, however, looked at the language of the will-the gift was 
in the beneficiary's own name rather than as trustee, and an alternate trustee was named 
but not given any legacy-and the circumstance that it seemed unlikely the entire estate 
would be given merely as compensation, and found that the property was an outright 
gift. Id. at 36, 127 N.E.2d at 668. 
30. In re Trybom's Will, 277 N.Y. at 109, 13 N.E.2d at 597 (O'Brien, J., dissenting). 
31. Id. at 109-10, 13 N.E.2d at 597 (O'Brien, J., dissenting). 
32. See 1 PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 1, § 5.5, at 170, 171. 
33. Jewell v. Barnes' Adm'r, 110 Ky. 329, 61 S.W. 360 (1901). 
34. Id. at 332, 61 S.W. at 361. 
35. 234 Iowa 502, 12 N.W.2d 211 (1944). 
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pressed wish in his will that his wife appoint the executors as 
her agents for certain purposes was "not a direct appointment 
... but merely a request - a precatory request," which im-
posed no obligation on the widow.36 
Yet interpreting the language as merely precatory also has 
the potential for producing a result not intended by the testator. 
Therefore, any determination that the language is precatory 
must at least be based on a finding that that is the testator's 
actual or presumed intent, and should not be made if it will 
thwart the testator's true intent.37 . 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in In re Hand's Es-
tate38 construed the language "'I request my executor . . . to 
employ my son, as far as it finds he can be of benefit to my 
estate, and to pay him for his services such compensation as it 
shall deem just and adequate' "39 to be mandatory.4o The finding 
was based on "the relations which existed between father and 
son and their past business connections,"41 and the rule of con-
struction that words of request directed to an executor are gen-
erally considered binding rather than precatory.42 Of course, a 
construction based on an interpretation of circumstances and 
rules of law also has at least the potential for undermining the 
testator's true intent. 
C. INCONSISTENCY IN DECISIONS 
Given the potential for thwarting the testator's intent, 
courts need to utilize a principled examination of the testator's 
intent, thereby increasing the likelihood that the true intent will 
36. Id. at 511, 12 N.W.2d at 215. 
37. The finding of intent generally goes beyond the literal· words of the will. In 
Bankers Trust of South Carolina u. Truesdale, the court construed the words "subject 
to the following terms and conditions," where the condition was beyond the control of 
the beneficiaries, to be merely precatory so that the bequest would not be defeated by 
failure of the condition. Truesdale, 237 S.E.2d 45, 49 (S.C. 1977). 
38. 315 Pa. 238, 172 A. 666 (1934). 
39. Id. at 240, 172 A. at 667. 
40. Id. at 244, 172 A. at 669. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. (citing 49 A.L.R. Annotated 31; Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions v. 
Culp, 151 Pa. 467, 25 A. 117 (1892); Edwards' Estate, 255 Pa. 358, 99 A. 1010 (1916); 
Stinson's Estate, 232 Pa. 218, 81 A. 207 (1911), 36 L.R.A. (N.S.) 504). 
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be given effect. Yet all too frequently the courts seem to base 
decisions regarding directions of employment arbitrarily on the 
type of employment involved. This focus on the type of employ-
ment is especially apparent where the designation is for the se-
lection of an attorney.43 
The great weight of authority is that a purported appoint-
ment of an attorney is not binding44 and gives the attorney no 
beneficial interest in the estate.4Ci For many years, the Louisiana 
decisions had formed a notable exception to this rule·.46 In the 
1929 case of Rivet v. Batistella47 the Louisiana Supreme Court 
declined to follow the lead of the states which find such designa-
tions to be non-binding.48 The court focused more on the intent 
of the testator than the problems involved in "forcing" this kind 
of personal services relationship, although it did recognize the 
latter.49 After citing several cases in line with majority view, the 
court noted that those cases all 
proceed upon the theory that the naming of an 
attorney may be distasteful or disadvantageous to 
the executor, and entirely overlook the fact that 
the testator may impose such conditions as he 
sees fit on his executor, and the latter is free to 
43. See 1 PAGE ON WILLS, supra, note 1, § 5.5, at 170. 
44. [d. See Carton v. Borden, 8 N.J. 352, 85 A.2d 257, 259 (1951) in which the court 
stated: 
A majority of the courts have taken the view that it is unjust 
to the trustee to compel him to employ as an attorney a per-
son in which he may lack confidence, where the result might 
well be disastrous to the administration of the trust, and that 
it is therefore against public policy to compel the trustee to 
employ him. 
See also e.g., Mason & Mason v. Brown, 182 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944) (writ ref'd 
w.o.m.); Robinson's Ex'rs v. Robinson, 297 Ky. 229, 235, 179 S.W.2d 886, 889 (1944) 
(dictum). 
45. In re Pickett's Will, 49 Or. 127, 137-38, 89 P. 377, 380 (1907), involved an attack 
on the validity of the will based on the argument that the attorney named in the will as 
attorney for the estate was disqualified as a subscribing witness to the will. The court 
found that the designation did not confer a beneficial interest in the estate in that it was 
not binding on the executor. Therefore, he was not disqualified as a witness. 
46. 1 PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 1, 5.5, at 170. See Succession of the Falgout, 279 
So.2d 679 (La. 1973), in which the court stated that "[sluch a designation becomes a 
condition of the legacies and the executor's appointment." [d. at 681. See also Succes-
sion of Pope, 230 La. 1049, 89 So.2d 894 (1956); Succession of Rembert, 199 La. 743, 7 
So.2d 40 (1942). . 
47. 167 La. 766, 120 So. 289 (1929). 
48. [d. at 769-70, 120 So. at 290. 
49. [d. at 770, 120 So. at 289-90. 
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accept or decline the trust if not satisfied with the 
conditions imposed. IIO 
If the real concern is what is "distasteful" or "disadvanta-
geous," it seems unclear why appointments of attorneys are gen-
erally unenforceable, whereas other types of appointments and 
conditions on gifts by will receive greater acceptance. III Certainly 
appointments in other areas have as much potential for being 
"distasteful" or "disadvantageous" to the executor or benefi-
ciaries as the appointment of an attorney. For example, "keep-
ing the accounts" of the estate, a designation which has been 
found to be enforceable,1I2 has the potential for creating signifi-
cant problems for the executor. Further, a direction to employ 
the testator's son to carryon the testator's business, also up-
held,1I3 can have significant impact on anyone with an interest in 
the estate. Problems can also be encountered, as the dissenting 
justice in Kelley v. Marlin pointed out, where a real estate agent 
is appointed. II. An analysis which superficially focuses on the 
type of employment increases the likelihood of arbitrary deci-
sions that do not address the real impact on the executor in any 
consistent way. 
III. A SUGGESTED FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF 
TESTAMENTARY APPOINTMENTS 
A. OVERVIEW 
A lot of the inconsistencies and unintended results could be 
alleviated by the use of a more principled and logical legal anal-
ysis. Such an analysis involves a recognition of the power of the 
testator to create certain conditions in his will, and an examina-
tion of two potential conditions in light of the intent of the tes-
tator. Further, the result is not dictated by the type of employ-
ment, except to the extent that the type of employment is 
relevant to determining testator's intent. 
50.Id. 
51. 1 PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 1, § 5.5, at 171. 
52. Id. at n. 12 (citing Harker v. Smith, 41 Ohio St. 236 (1884)). 
53. In re Hand's Estate, 315 Pa. 238, 172 A. 666 (1934). 
54. Kelley, 714 S.W.2d 303, 308·09 (Wallace, J., dissenting). 
10
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B. CONDITIONS AND INTENT 
1. The Two Conditions 
Testators are generally free to create any conditions they 
want in a will, as long as they are not against public policy. &1\ A 
direction to an executor or beneficiary to employ a named indi-
vidual, potentially involves two conditions. First of all, hiring 
the designated employee may be a condition which must be ful-
filled before the named executor can be appointed, or the named 
beneficiary can receive the bequest. liS For example, in Rivet, the 
court stated that an executor who would not accept the condi-
tion of employing a designated attorney could "decl~ne the 
trust,"117 indicating that he could accept the trust only if he 
agrees to fulfill the condition. Second, the performance of the 
employee may also be a condition to the receipt of payment.1I8 
Thus, in Browne v. Bayonne Trust CO.,119 the funeral director 
specified by the testator, who was not hired and therefore did 
not serve, had not fulfilled this condition and thus had no claim 
against the estate. so In other words, the bequest or appointment 
could be conditioned on hiring the designated employee, and the 
compensation of the employee could be conditioned on service. 
Looking at the first possibility, the coercive effects of the 
"condition" are obvious. If the right to receive a substantial gift 
or appointment is conditioned on hiring a designated individual, 
there is considerable pressure to hire that individual. Recogniz-
ing the coercive effect of the condition, and considering the pol-
icy favoring freedom of choice where personal services are in-
volved,s1 courts sometimes hold that the interest in freedom of 
choice outweighs the normally paramount consideration of the 
55. 5 PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 1, 44.3, at 401 (1962). 
56. "Where it clearly appears that the gift was only upon condition precedent that 
the devisee should perform some act, the devise will not take effect' unless the condition 
is complied with ... " Id. 44.6. 
57. Rivet, 167 La. at 770, 120 So. at 290. 
58. 1 PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 1, § 5.5, at 171. 
59. 118 N.J.L. 396, 193 A. 179 (1937). 
60.Id. 
61. See Kelley, 714 S.W.2d at 308, (Wallace, J., dissenting); Kelley, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. 
J. at 412. 
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intent of the testator.82 As to the second condition, a decision 
such as one described in Browne could result in the loss of a 
benefit which the testator actually intended to confer on the 
designee.88 Either analysis potentially defeats the testator's in-
tent. Yet by analyzing the cases in light of the two conditions, it 
is still possible to look primarily to the testator's intent without 
violating any significant policy concerns, or any legal rules re-
lated to conditions. 
2. Intent of the Testator 
A key factor in examining the intent of the testator is decid-
ing whether his main intent in directing the employment is to 
benefit the estate or beneficiary on the one hand, or the em-
ployee, on the other hand. Actually, as pointed out by Professor 
Scott ill his article Testamentary Directions to Employ,84 a dual 
benefit is often contemplated.811 Nonetheless, at least some in-
tent to benefit the employee is crucial to his ability to seek re-
dress. If the sole intent is to benefit the estate or beneficiary, the 
designated employee would be merely an incidental beneficiary 
of the designation,88 with no standing to. complain if not 
employed.87 
62. Id. See also 1 PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 1, § 5.5, at 171. As' to the primacy of 
the testator's intent generally, see supra PAGE ON WILLS, note 1, 30.6, at 26 (1961). 
63. In Browne, the direction to appoint a designated funeral director, obviously re-
flecting the testator's intent, was defeated by a holding that the designee who, not having 
actually performed, had no enforceable right in the designation. Browne, 193 A. 179. 
64. Scott, Testamentary Directions to Employ, 41 HARV. L. REV. 709 (1928). 
65. As Professor Scott stated: 
Id. at 713. 
[The testator) may intend to confer a benefit both upon the 
cestuis que trust and upon the designated person, and thus to 
kill two birds with one stone. The testator may desire to re-
ward an old employee for his past services by assuring him a 
continuation of his position, or he may desire to give a posi-
tion to a relative or friend; and this he may do because he also 
thinks that the designated person is the person most compe-
tent to fill the position. 
66. See infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text. 
67. Scott, supra note 64, at 713. In In re Platt's Will, the court found that, while 
the direction to the guardian of the testator's son to continue the employment of testa-
tor's housekeeper was binding on the guardian, it was given entirely for the son's benefit, 
and therefore conferred no right on the housekeeper. In re Platt's Will, 205 Wis. 290, 
297, 237 N.W. lO9, 112 (1931). 
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This result is apparent when the relationship is examined as 
a third party beneficiary relationship. In a third party benefi-
ciary contract, the promisor promises to do something which will 
benefit a third party, and the promisee exacts the promise with 
the intent to benefit the third party.S8 If there were a contract 
between the testator and the fiduciary or beneficiary, such that 
the latter promised to hire the employee if a certain gift or ap-
pointment were made, then the employee would be a third party 
beneficiary with enforceable rights in that agreement (assuming 
the requisite intent to benefit).s9 . 
In the context of the direction to employ, there is not really 
a contract, but there is a relationship created between the testa-
tor, the employee, and the executor or beneficiary. There may 
be, in essence, an implied contract based on acceptance of a gift 
or appointment which was conditioned on hiring the designated 
employee.70 The testator directs the employment, much as the 
promisee exacts a promise, and the "employee" will benefit by 
the hiring in the same way that a third party beneficiary benefits 
from the performance of the promisor in a third party benefi-
ciary contract. In both cases, however, that expected benefit only 
gives rise to a cause of action if the beneficiary is an intended, 
rather than an incidental, beneficiary.71 
A person who incidentally benefits from the per-
formance of a trust has no better standing to en-
force the trust or to recover damages for a breach 
of trust than has an incidental beneficiary of a 
contract to enforce the contract or to recover 
damages for a breach of the contract.72 
Where the employee is an incidental beneficiary, he has no 
rights against the estate.7S For example, in Browne, supra, the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey declined to find that the executor 
had a duty to employ the undertaker designated by the testator. 
68. See generally E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §§ 10.2 and 10.3 (1982); J. CALAMARI 
& J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 17-1 (3d ed. 1987). 
69. See e.g., Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N.Y. 233, 120 N.E. 639 (1918). See also 2 S. 
WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS 370, at 908-12 (1959). 
70. See e.g., Seaver V. Ransom, 224 N.Y. at 241, 120 N.E. at 642; 2 WILLISTON, 
supra 370, note 69, at 912-913. . 
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 315 (1981). 
72. Scott, supra note 64, at 713. 
73.Id. 
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It stated, "In our view the will was not a legacy in favor of the 
respondent, nor did it establish any rights for his benefit. It was 
simply a direction to the executor in which the respondent had 
no interest or legal right."74 Where there is sufficient actual in-
tent to benefit the employee, however, a remedy must be fash-
ioned which will as nearly as possible effectuate the testator's 
intent. 
For example, in Kelley v. Marlin the executor hired the tes-
tator's wife's son by a prior marriage to sell real estate that was 
to be sold by Mr. Marlin under the terms of the WilPIi It would 
seem that the testator intended not only a benefit to the estate 
based on his respect for Mr. Marlin's abilities, but also intended 
to give a benefit to Mr. Marlin due to the longstanding relation-
ship between the two. In such a case, the fiduciary or beneficiary 
generally should not and will not be allowed to thwart the testa-
tor's intent by hiring someone else. 
If it is decided that the testator really intended to benefit 
the employee, and that intent should not be frustrated, the 
question becomes one of how the benefit will be conferred, and 
what effect the failure to hire has on the named executor or ben-
eficiary. A possible remedy for the disappointed designee would 
be one of specific performance. This is clearly not a desirable 
remedy due to the personal services nature of the employment.76 
Professor Scott thoroughly explored and rejected this remedy in 
his work,77 and, in fact, it is not generally seriously considered as 
an available remedy in such cases,78 although the compensation 
may in fact be paid as if the employee had performed.79 Of 
course, a finding that carrying out the designated employment is 
a condition to receipt of a gift could· have almost the same effect, 
since many beneficiaries may comply with the condition rather 
than forfeit the bequest. Likewise, if an executor cannot be ap-
pointed unless he agrees to stated conditions, either he will com-
ply, or another executor will be appointed who will comply. 
74. 118 N.J.L. 396, 193 A. 179 (1937). 
75. 714 S.W.2d 303, 305 (Tex. 1986). 
76. See generally FARNSWORTH, supra note 68, § 12.4, at 822; CALAMARI AND PE-
RILLO, supra note 68 16-5, at 666-67. 
77. Scott, supra note 64, at 720-22. 
78. Id. at 721 n. 31. 
79. See infra note 108 and accompanying text. 
14
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [1990], Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol20/iss2/2
1990] TESTAMENTARY DESIGNATIONS OF ATTORNEYS 275 
3. Conditional Bequests and Appointments 
This forfeiture of the bequest or appointment will not at-
tain unless it is decided that a condition is intended. In order to 
find this, it must be determined that the intent that the employ-
ment occur is sufficiently strong that the failure to employ 
should cause a forfeiture of the bequest or appointment. There 
are cases generally where a condition is clear and, if not fulfilled, 
will cause such a forfeiture.8o However, this intent must be clear 
and a condition will not be created by implication to cause a 
forfeiture not intended by the testator.81 In Kelley v. Marlin,82 
for example, although it is reasonable to find that the testator 
intended to benefit his longtime real estate agent by appointing 
him under the will, it is not likely that the intent was so strong 
that he would want his wife to forfeit her interest for failure to 
perform the "condition." 
This forfeiture can be avoided by finding that no condition 
was intended, and that, at most, the designation creates a charge 
against the estate rather than a forfeiture of the entire estate.8S 
Cases dealing with "conditional gifts" are enlightening in this 
regard, in that the reasoning related to forfeiture in those cases 
can be carried over to the employment designation cases.84 In 
the "conditional gift" cases, the forfeiture is generallYSIl avoided 
by creating a charge or lien against the devised property to fulfill 
the "condition," while still allowing the bequest to be carried 
80. The number of potential conditions seems to be limited only by the imagination 
of the testator. Testators have, for example, attached to the receipt of a bequest condi-
tions as to birth of issue, marriage, divorce, religious belief, insolvency, and use of prop-
erty. See generally, 5 PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 1, §§ 44.21-44.33 (1962). 
81. [d. 44.2. 
82. 714 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. 1986). 
83. See infra note 86 and accompanying text. 
84. Many of the cases involve a condition of support or payment to another, al-
though the reasoning could also apply to a direction to hire a named individual. See 
Kelley, 714 S.W.2d at 305. 
85. The terms used may be different in some cases, with some courts using a "condi-
tion subsequent" finding to avoid the forfeiture. For example, the Supreme Court of 
Georgia used this reasoning in Raby v. Minshew, 238 Ga. 41, 231 S.E.2d 53 (1976) deal-
ing with a devise to testator's son and daughter on the condition that they care for testa-
tor's wife during her lifetime. The court construed this to be a condition subsequent, 
rather than precedent, so that performance would be excused due to impossibility, the 
wife having predeceased the testator. [d. at 42,231 S.E.2d at 54. See generally 5 PAGE ON 
WILLS, supra note 1, 44.4 (1962). . 
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out.88 
For example, in Whicher v. Abbot,87 the testator's property, 
which included real property, was devised to one of his sons on 
the "condition" that he provide support and maintenance for 
the testator's incompetent son for the rest of the latter's life-
time. The competent son predeceased the incompetent. There-
fore, it was impossible for him to completely fulfill the condi-
tion. The court refused to construe the language as creating a 
condition, in spite of fairly clear conditional language, looking at 
the effect of such a construction - a forfeiture of the devise - in 
relation to the testator's intent. 88 In doing so, the court stated: 
No language will be construed into a condition 
subsequent contrary to the intention of the par-
ties, when the intent can be gathered from the 
whole instrument read in the light of surrounding 
conditions. The strongest words of condition will 
not work a forfeiture of the estate unless they 
were intended to so operate.89 
Here, looking at the entire will and surrounding circum-
stances, the court found that the dominant intent of providing 
for care for the incompetent son would not be furthered by a 
forfeiture of the estate, but would be furthered by the creation 
of a charge on the ,estate to provide for the support as needed.90 
86. Miller v. Miller, 197 Neb. 171, 247 N.W.2d 445 (1976) (devise to beneficiary on 
the condition that he pay $2,000 each to four people found to create fee simple subject to 
liens for said payments); Hitz v. Estate of Hitz, 319 N.W.2d 137 (N.D. 1982) (devise of 
interest in land to son "provided" he pay $4,000 to daughter held to create vested inter-
est subject to equitable lien to secure payment of the $4,000); Rubio v. Valdez, 603 
S.W.2d 346 (Tex.Civ.Ap. - Eastland 1980) (devise of real estate to son "upon his paying" 
$10,000 to other children held to create fee simple interest subject to a charge only). 
87. 449 A.2d 353 (Me. 1982). 
88.Id. 
89. Id. at 356. 
90. Id. See also 6 PAGE ON WILLS, supra note I, § 51.4, in which it is stated that: 
The courts prefer to construe such provison [devise made "on 
condition" of payment to a third party] as creating charges 
rather than conditions, since they prefer a construction which 
will make the estate vest as early as possible. . .. If the provi-
sion is merely a condition . . . the failure of the devisee to 
make such payments ... [may] defeat the beneficial legacy or 
support payments to the third person . . . and . . . likewise 
defeat the legacy . . . . For these reasons, the courts are dis-
posed to treat such provisions as creating charges or liens ... 
16
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The rationale for finding a charge on the estate is especially 
strong when, as in Whicher, a conditional devise of real property 
is involved.91 Yet whether the bequest includes real property or 
not, the overriding consideration is whether it is the intent of 
the testator that the bequest be forfeited by a failure to perform 
as indicated. If that is not the intent, then there is no condition, 
but rather a duty to do as the testator directed.92 Thus, no ques-
tion of forfeiture is involved,93 but the question whether the 
compensation is to be paid by way of creation of a charge on the 
estate must be addressed. 
In cases in which the potential "condition" on the bequest 
is a direction to give something to a third party, once it is de-
cided that the bequest is not actually conditional, the "charge" 
is essentially automatic since the intent is clear. For example, in 
Whicher, the testator's intent to provide for his incompetent son 
is obvious, and the provision for the son is totally gratuitous 
(Le., requires no action on the part of the son). On the other 
hand, in the instance of a testamentary appointment, there is 
the additional consideration that th~ testator frequently intends 
that the estate will receive a quid pro quo for the payment to 
the employee.94 Thus, even after a finding that a charge against 
the estate or bequest is preferred over a forfeiture, it still re-
rather than as conditions. 
Id. at 117-118 (footnotes omitted). 
91. When the estate consists at least partially of real estate, there is the additional 
consideration of the need for stability of title to support finding a charge rather than a 
condition subsequent. See e.g., Helms v. Helms, 135 N.C. 164, 171, 47 S.E. 415, 418 
(1904) in which the court stated: 
The difficulties which readily occur in treating provisions of 
this kind as conditions are numerous. The uncertainty into . 
which titles would be thrown is a strong reason for construing 
provisions for support as covenants and not conditions is rec-
ognized by the courts. . . . The courts have almost uniformly 
treated the claim for support and maintenance as a charge 
upon the land, which will follow it into the hands of 
purchasers. . 
92. See id. The duty is created by a covenant which is implied rather than ex-
pressed. Ct. supra, note 70 and accompanying text. 
93. To avoid forfeiture (here, forfeiture of the right to receive property or qualify as 
executor), there is generally a preference for finding a duty, rather than a condition. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 227 comments band d (1981). This is because a 
failure to perform a condition would result in forfeiture of the right to return perform-
ance. Id. at 224 and 227 comment b. Whereas the failure to perform a duty, unless such 
failure is material, would not. Id. at 227, comment d. 
94. Scott, supra note 64, at 726. 
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mains to be decided if such charge should be made in spite of 
nonperformance of the employment. 
4. Service as a Condition to Payment 
At this point one analyzes the receipt of compensation in 
terms of conditions - that is, by asking whether the perform-
ance is a condition to payment. If not, then there· is simply an 
unconditional gift, as discussed above.911 If performance is a con-
dition to payment, one must further look to the law of condi-
tions to discover what will happen if the condition is not 
performed. 
Willful nonperformance presents an easy case. If the desig-
nated employee refuses to accept the employment, he, of course, 
will not be paid.98 In this case, however, the parties generally 
will not find themselves in court. 
Not quite as clearcut, but not really conceptually trouble-
some either, are the cases in which performance. is attempted, 
but is materially deficient. If it is found that performance is a 
condition to payment, then that performance should give the es-
tate the intended return for the expenditure. If the executor had 
hired the employee without direction from the testator, he 
would clearly have the right to insist on the agreed performance 
before being required to pay for the service.97 Likewise, if one 
person had hired the employee to perform for a third party, he 
too could insist on the agreed performance prior to making pay-
ment.98 The fact that the testator had directed the employment 
by the executor or beneficiary should not change this result, and 
payment will not be due if there is a material breach of the con-
95. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text. 
96. In such a case, where the offer of employment is not accepted, no contract is 
ever formed on which to base a claim for payment. 
97. It is well settled that where the performance of one party is to occur over a 
period of time, and the performance of the other party consists of payment, the perform-
ance must occur before the payment, absent a contrary intention. RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 234 comment e (1981). 
98. This would create a third party beneficiary contract with the person hiring the 
employee being the promisee. The promise to perform by the employee (promisor) "cre-
ates a duty in the promisor to the promisee to perform the promise even though he also 
has a similar duty to an intended beneficiary." [d. at § 305(1). 
18
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tract in the performance condition. Further, the executor or ben-
eficiary will be able to dismiss the employee and hire someone 
who will perform.99 
The possibility of dismissal for causelOO to some extent an-
swers any objections regarding a "forced" employment relation-
ship. It is less objectionable to expect the executor or beneficiary 
to abide by the testator's wishes if the result of doing so is not to 
force him to accept inadequate performance. If the objection is 
really that the executor would be liable for bad advice, the an-
swer, at least to a degree, is in the ability to discharge or refuse 
to employ incompetent counse1.101 This ability not only flows 
from the contractual arrangement, but will also most likely com-
port with the testator's intent. 
The disputed cases involve a designated employee, not dis-
missed or rejected for cause, whose failure to perform is none-
theless not voluntary. If the failure is due to something beyond 
the control of the beneficiary or fiduciary, then it is conceptually 
a case of impossibiity or impracticability.lo2 Whether the result 
of that is that there is no obligation to the employee, or that the 
performance is excused and payment made, will again depend 
on whether the testator's primary intent was to benefit the es-
tate or the employee. Analogous to a condition of service to the 
estate after the testator's death is a condition of service to the 
testator at the time of the testator's death. In Wooster School 
Corp. v. Hammerer/os the testator had devised certain property 
99. See Scott, supra note 64, at 714-15. 
100. Even the Supreme Court of Louisiana, when it was regularly upholding the 
validity of designation of attorney for the estate, implicitly recognized the right of the 
executor to dismiss said attorney for cause in stating that "unless facts exist which fur-
nish adequate cause recognized in law for refusing to do so, the executor must abide by 
the lawful condition imposed by the decedent in his testament." Succession of Falgout, 
279 So.2d 679, 681 (1973) (emphasis added). The court therefore found that in that case, 
since no cause for dismissal of the attorney had been asserted, the motion to discharge 
the attorney should be denied. [d. at 682. 
101. A trustee would certainly be justified in discharging from the em~ 
ployment or in refusing to employ the person designated by 
the testator upon the same grounds which would justify one 
who had made a contract to employ another for a fixed period 
in discharging him from the employment or in refusing to em-
ploy him ... 
Scott, supra note 64 at 714. 
102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 comment d (1981). 
103. 410 So.2d 524 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). 
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to Hammerer on the condition that he be in the employ of the 
testator at her death. A few months before testator's death, and 
after she was suffering from the effects of a stroke, Hammerer 
was essentially forced to leave the testator's employ by her 
nephew and sister.l04 The court held that Hammerer was none-
theless entitled to the bequest, since the performance of the con-
dition had been prevented by a third party. 1011 In so holding, the 
court gave paramount consideration to the intent of the testator 
as to the benefit to flow from the provision. As the court stated: 
[W]here it becomes impossible for the condition 
to be performed without the fault of the donee, 
performance should be excused unless it be deter-
mined that performance of the condition was the 
controlling motive for the testator's making of the 
bequest .... The determining inquiry should be 
whether the testator's intent in making a bequest 
was to benefit the donee or to obtain strict per-
formance of some important act in any and all 
events, with the donee being paid, by way of be-
quest, for performing the act.lOe 
The same reasoning could be applied when the performance pre-
vented was to have been for the estate after the testator's death. 
In fact, most of the cases dealing with testamentary ap-
pointments will be prevention cases, since the "impossibility" 
will most often be the result of the refusal of the executor or 
beneficiary to make the designated appointment. lo7 A fortiari, if 
the condition were prevented by the act of the beneficiary or 
fiduciary, given sufficient intent of the 'testator to benefit the do-
104, [d. at 525. 
105, [d. at 527. The excuse of prevention generally refers to prevention by a party to 
the contract. See generally CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 68, 11-28. Since the preven-
tion here was that of a third party, this is instead a case of impossibility, which includes 
prevention by a third party. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 comment d 
(1981) ("Events that come within the rule stated in this section are generally due either 
to 'acts of God' or to acts of third parties.") (emphasis added). 
106. Hammerer, 410 So.2d at 527. 
107. The other impossibility scenario most likely to occur is the situation in which 
the designated employee predeceases the testator. In such cases, however, not only is it 
unlikely that a claim would be made, but it is highly unlikely that the testator intended 
the benefit to go to the estate of the employee, thereby diminishing his own estate with-
out the receipt of any quid pro quo. 
While one could conjure up other impossibility cases, they would likely be too rare 
to warrant discussion here, and could be handled as they arise using the same principles 
discussed here. 
20
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [1990], Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol20/iss2/2
1990] TESTAMENTARY DESIGNATIONS OF ATTORNEYS 281 
nee, the condition should be excused and payment due from the 
estate or out of estate property as if the condition had been per-
formed. loe Under this analysis, the testator's intent is most fully 
realized. The primary gift or appointment is made, albeit dimin-
ished by the payment to the designated employee, who still re-
ceives the benefit intended. Further, if the employment is of a 
nature that would preclude other employment,109 the amount 
paid to the "employee" could be reduced by any amount actu-
ally earned by the employee in any other capacity during the 
same time periods.110 
5. The Relationship between Intent and the Type. of 
Employment 
Assuming that the intent of the testator controls, it should 
not be necessary to ask whether public policy is offended more 
by a direction to hire a lawyer, an accountant, a real estate 
agent, or some other classification of employee. One simply asks 
what conditions were created by the testator by examining his 
intent as indicated in' the will and the circumstances. Yet if this 
, approach is taken, the inevitable question is whether there is a 
principled basis for the now overwhelming majority view that di-
rections to employ attorneys are generally unenforceable, 111 
while other designations receive greater acceptance. lUl To answer 
the question, it is enlightening to examine the analysis on a step 
by step basis. 
The first question is whether the direction to hire is a condi-
tion to the appointment of the executor, or to the receipt of 
property under the will. ll8 That question is answered by simply 
determining whether the testator would want the bequest or ap-
pointment to fail if the direction to employ is not followed.114 
Intent should be the key here, not the type of employment. Gen-
108. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 68, 11-28 (3d ed. 1987). 
109. For example, a wage earner in a full time position would only be able to hold 
one such position at a time, whereas an attorney or real estate agent might be able to 
serve even though also serving other clients or principals. 
110. See Scott, 8upra note 64, at 725. 
111. See supra notes 44 and 45 and accompanying text. 
112. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
113. See supra text accompanying note 56. 
114. See supra text accompanying notes 80 and 81. 
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erally, the "power to dispose of property by will includes the 
right to attach to testamentary gifts such terms, conditions, or 
restrictions as the testator pleases, provided they are not con-
trary to public policy or forbidden by law."llli 
In dealing with conditions to bequests generally, the courts 
have been reluctant to defeat the intent of the testator unless 
the violation of public policy is clear.ll6 For example, an Oregon 
Court of Appeals gave effect to a condition requiring forfeiture 
of a life estate in certain real and personal property if the devi-
see failed to reside on the real property for six months in any 
year, unless prevented from doing so by illness.ll7 Although the 
devisee had become physically disabled, and found it necessary 
to leave the premises to further her education so that she could 
support herself, the court found that she had still failed to fulfill 
the condition in that "her disabilities did not prevent her from 
residing on the property."118 Certainly if the real consideration is 
what is "distasteful" or "disadvantageous,"119 a condition such 
as this one has potentially much greater significance than the 
designation of a particular attorney.120 
115. Brown v. Drake, 275 S.C. 299, 300, 270 S.E.2d 130, 131 (1980). 
116. In the Brown case, the Supreme Court of South Carolina upheld a will provi-
sion disinheriting any children of the testator if .. 'awarded to'" his second wife or 
.. 'raised by her after 1 year of age.' " The court found that the provision, while arguably 
"obnoxious", could not have affected the conduct of the wife or children in the past, 
since they normally would not even be aware of its presence in the will, and could not 
now affect future conduct. Since it could not affect custody when the will becomes effec-
tive, and since the testator has a right to disinherit his children for any reason acceptable 
to him, no public policy was violated. [d. at 302-304, 270 S.E.2d at 131-132. 
117. Sarvela v. McCoy, 46 Or. App. 515, 612 P.2d 314-15 (1980). 
118. [d. at 519, 612 P.2d at 315. 
119. See supra text accompanying note 50. 
120. Cf. Cast v. National Bank of Commerce Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 185 Neb. 358, 176 
N.W.2d 29 (1970), in which the Supreme Court of Nebraska upheld a will condition that 
in order to receive the testator's interest in the family farm, the devisee, or one of his 
children, should move onto the farm and maintain it as his residence for twenty-five 
years, and legally change his name to include the name "Webermeier" in it. The court 
withdrew its opinion in part the following year, holding the condition void. Cast v. Na-
tional Bank of Commerce Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 186 Neb. 385, 183 N.W.2d 485 (1971). The 
basis for this, however, was that the provision was an indirect restraint on alienation of a 
fee simple estate. Presumably, a condition without this consideration, such as a similar 
condition to taking the interest initially or to a lesser estate, would have been upheld. As 
the court stated: 
Where a grantor or testator grants or, devises a fee simple title, 
he is not permitted to fetter the title that he created with in-
consequential and unreasonable conditions otherwise valid. 
Such conditions are not favored in the law and they should be 
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Indeed, the· early Louisiana cases,. while representing a de-
cidedly minority view,l2l stressed the freedom of the named ex-
ecutor to decline if he did not wish to accept the conditions of 
the appointment. As stated by the Supreme Court of Louisiana 
in Succession of Rembert: 
Upon [the executor] is placed the duty of taking 
the will as left by the testator and executing it in 
its minutest detail to the utmost of his ability. 
There is no mandatory provision of the law that 
thrusts this trust upon him; he may reject it if he 
so desires. But once it has been accepted, he ac-
cepts also the duty imposed upon him of seeing 
that all of the valid provisions and dispositions of 
the will are performed.122 . 
Viewed from this perspective, it appears that the point of 
departure separating the early Louisiana decisions from the cur-
rent vast majority is not really a different attitude about the im-
portance of the personal services relationship. The difference, it 
seems, lies in differing interpretations of the relative importance 
to the testator of the appointment made in the will. This be-
came especially clear when· the Louisiana court reversed itself in 
1986 in Succession of Ado Jenkins,123 in which it held the desig-
nation of an attorney for the estate to be merely precatory, leav-
ing the executor free to hire whomever he or she pleased.124 
The result in that case does not necessarily represent a 
cliange in attitude about the importance of the intent Of the tes-
strictly construed against the testator or grantor as against a 
fee simple title. It is true, generally speaking, that a testator 
may dispose of his property as he pleases . .. but. .. one will 
not be permitted to become whimsical and unreasonable after 
creating an estate recognized by the law, such as an estate 'in 
fee simple, by attaching conditions repugnant to the estate 
created. On the other hand, we do not go so far as to say that 
all conditions subsequent attached to a fee simple estate are 
void where alienability is not involved. A condition attached 
to a fee simple estate, otherwise valid must be reasonable and 
not affect its marketability. 
[d. at 390-91, 183 N.W.2d at 489. . 
121. Bee supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
122. 199 La. 743, 750-51, 7 So.2d 40, 42 (1942) (emphasis added). See also Rivet, 167 
La. at 770, 120 So. at 290. 
123. 481 So.2d 607 (La. 1986). 
124. [d. at 610. 
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tator, but rather a different view of what that intent is. It lends 
support to the view that there is at least a strong presumption 
against an interpretation that the testator intends the designa-
tion of employment of an attorney to be a condition to being 
named executor. The presumption is not justified by finding a 
greater importance in allowing freedom to choose one's own at-
torney as opposed to freedom to make other similar choices, but 
in the circumstances of the naming of the attorney in the will in 
the first instance.126 Absent unusual circumstances, it would not 
seem to be the usual intent of a testator that his choice of attor-
ney take precedence over his choice of executor, given the im-
portance of the position of executor and the confidence the tes-
tator normally has in his choice for that position.126 . 
In addition to that factor, there is a strong public policy 
concern in relation to the opportunity for overreaching by the 
attorney preparing the will in influencing the client to appoint 
. him as either the executor or the attorney of the estate.127 The 
Supreme Court of Wisconsin in State v. Gulbankian128 strongly 
disapproved the practice of attorneys influencing clients in any 
way to make such appointments, whether by consultation, using 
a will form designating an attorney for the estate, providing 
safekeeping for the will, or any other method.129 Even so,· the 
court recognized that the pressures can be subtle and difficult to 
police. ISO Given the difficulty of enforcement, the opportunity 
for influence, the likelihood that many clients would not even 
think of appointing an "attorney for the estate" without a sug-
gestion from someone else, and the need to avoid even the sug-
gestion of professional impropriety,l3l courts should be ex-
tremely reluctant to find that the hiring of a named attorney is a 
condition precedent to appointment as executor or to receiving a 
benefit under the will. 
These same considerations are generally not present when 
other types of employment are involved. Other types of employ-
125. "For the attorney drafting a will to be named as attorney for the succession has 
at least a suggestion of impropriety." Id. at 609-10. 
126. In re Braasch's Estate, 274 Wis. at 573, 80 N.W.2d at 759. 
127. See generally Annot. 57 A.L.R. 3d 703 (1974). 
128. 54 Wis.2d 605, 196 N.W.2d 733 (1972). 
129. Id. at 611, 196 N.W.2d at 736. 
130. Id. at 612, 196 N.W.2d at 737. 
131. Id. 
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ees will not normally be -directly involved in the writing of the 
will. Further, the legal profession has a strong interest in main-
taining its image of integrity in the eyes of the public,132 an in-
terest which may not be as compelling for some other profes-
sions. However, regardless of the nature of service to be 
perfor!p.ed, all of the relevant circumstances should be examined 
before it is decided that a gift or appointment is to be forfeited 
for a failure to hire the designated employee, and due considera-
tion should be given to the possibility of improper influence on 
the part of the designee. 
As to a direction to hire a named attorney, however, a pre-
sumption against a finding that the executor's appointment is 
conditioned on hiring the attorney is not tantamount to a rule of 
law. Compliance with the testator's request could in fact be a 
condition precedent to such appointment if that is the true in-
tent. That such a condition, if intended, is enforceable, is clearly 
illustrated in In re Estate of Devroy133 in which the designation 
of the personal representative was specifically conditioned on 
the retention of a particular attorney. In addition to the condi-
tional language, the testator named an alternative representa-
tive, and further provided that if either personal representative 
named was unable or unwilling to serve, the court should" 'ap-
point a personal representative who will retain' " the designated 
attorney.134 This language, along with a recitation of reasons for 
the importance of the appointment,1311 underscores the testator's 
intent, and that intent takes precedence over the policy argu-
ments.13S Thus, the real policy concern where attorney designa-
tions are involved is not so much a policy against a finding that 
the appointment of the executor is conditioned on hiring a 
named attorney, where that is the clear intent, as a policy 
against a finding of such intent in the first place in the absence 
of the clearest of circumstances. 
If hiring the employee (attorney or otherwise) is a condition, 
and that condition is not fulfilled, then the court will simply re-
fuse to appoint, or will remove, the executor, or direct that the 
132. See C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 3.1 at 81-82 (Practitioner's ed. 1986). 
133. 109 Wis.2d 154, 325 N.W.2d 345 (1982). 
134. [d. at 156, 325 N.W.2d at 346. 
135. [d. 
136. See id. 
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bequest be given to the alternate beneficiary. If it is not a condi-
tion, the next step is to determine the effect of the refusal to 
hire. There can, of course, be no legal effect unless the suggested 
employee has standing to sue for payment. This depends on 
whether he is an intended beneficiary (i.e., was really intended 
by the testator to benefit by the designation).137 
At this point in the analysis, the type of employment as-
sumes a lesser degree of importance, although, in the case of an 
attorney, the Gulbankian concerns will always be present to 
some extent. The real focus of the inquiry at this point is on the 
relationship of the designated employee to the testator. If there 
is a close personal or familial relationship, a court may well find 
that it is the testator's intent that the "employee" receive pay-
ment even if his services are refused. On the other hand, absent 
such a relationship, the intent of the testator would normally be 
primarily to benefit the beneficiaries of the estate, with the inci-
dental benefit to the employee requiring the quid pro quo of ser-
vice to the estate.138 Thus, service would be a condition to pay-
ment, and as an incidental beneficiary only, the employee would 
have no standing to complain about not being hired. Again, such 
a finding is based on the intent of'the testator, and where it 
clearly appears that payment is to be made in spite of preven-
tion of performance, as in Trybom's,139 then the payment will be 
made. 
137. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text. 
138. Compare Scott, supra note 64 at 723-24 dealing with the refusal of a trustee to 
hire a designated employee. As Professor Scott stated: 
[d. at 724. 
The testator normally intends primarily to benefit the cestuis 
que trust. He does not intend to diminish the amount which 
they will receive by subjecting the estate to a liability for dam-
ages to the person whom he desires to give empl.oyment. He 
may have hoped to kill two birds with one stone. But if the 
trustee refuses to comply with the direction and, for some rea-
sons of policy, cannot be compelled to comply, the stone will 
miss one of the birds. Either the cestuis que trust or the per-
son whom the testator directed the trustee to employ must 
suffer. In the absence of other evidence of the testator's inten-
tion, his primary purpose to benefit the cestuis que trust 
should be carried out. 
139. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
An analysis focusing on the intent of the testator in relation· 
to the two conditions discussed above should generaily produce 
more consistent results. The analysis, however, could and should 
be rendered unnecessary by careful, professional draftsmanship. 
This professionalism in drafting is lacking if the attorney sug-
gests a designation of his own employment in any capacity.140 
Yet the problems are not confined to appointments of attor-
neys.141 Generally, it is best to avoid problems by not attempting 
to tie the hands of the executor or beneficiary in selecting any 
fiduciaries and employees. 
Even in cases in which it is important to the testator to 
make certain directions to employ, the consequencess of a fail-
ure to hire, or a failure to perform, should be clearly set out in 
the will. For example, the testator could, similar to a suggestion 
made by Professor Scott in the trust context,142 specify payment 
for a given service, making it clear whether the payment is to be 
forfeited if the "employee" refuses to perform the service. Provi-
sion could also be made for a refusal of the executor or benefi-
ciary to employ the designated person. That is, it should be clear 
whether there is a forfeiture of the bequest or appointment be-
cause of such refusal. It should further be made clear whether a 
"disappointed designee" is entitled to damages, full payment, 
partial payment, or no payment. Given the basic proposition 
that the intent of the testator controls,148 the more clearly that 
intent can be expressed, the fewer problems are likely to be en-
countered in the administration of the estate. 
140. Gulbankian, 54 Wis. 2d at 610·12, 196 N.W.2d at 736·37. 
141. See supra text accompanying notes 51·54. 
142. See Scott, supra note 64 at 724·25. 
143. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
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